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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAil 
Ml\SCARO and 
c:.!lf"LllY TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
Case No. 19024 
v. 
JC\Htl S. DAVIS, CHARLEY JOSEPH, 
Cl'PT:S B/\UM, individuals, anu 
CHATILLION, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
POINT I 
"''lE OF FACTS RECITED BY RESPONDENT'S 
BRJ Er IS ItlAC'CUPATE AND tlISLEADING. 
The respondent's in his brief spend approximately ten 
page's setting out 3 very det"liled statement of facts. It 
shoulu be noted that the case at bar deals with setting aside 
d def3ult judgment and that there has only been one eviden-
t1ary hearing in this matter. It should also be noted that 
none of the respondents' citations are to that evidentiary 
hearing. In many instances, the so-called "facts" are merely 
r"spowlents' version of what he believes the facts should hdve 
le'""'' based on the respondents' own affidavits. Nor are these 
s:-'.3lled "facts" in many instances supported by the record. 
A. Mascaro, Not __ Of n'1:--,; 
Pocket Expenses For the Partnership. 
On page 2 of his brief, respondent states: 
In fact, in 1977 and 1978 defendd11t-respcJ11,Je11c, 
Joseph, expended over $10,000.00 in out-of-pocJ.-.Eet 
expenses in this effort . 
Respondent supports this contention by ct citc1tion L 
pages 301 to 303 of the record. Respondent's citc1tion t'J d 
rather self-serving affidavit of Charley Joseph. tJ ever t e 1 es s, 
an examination of this affidavit makes it cle,:ir that ap;'<"lla:.: 
Joseph Mascaro, not respondent Charley Joseph, was the one whc 
expended the over $10, 000 in out-of-pocket expenses un behdlf 
of the partnership. The pertinent part of resp:::in'.lent 's affiJa-
vit provides as follows: 
Shortly after John Davis receiveJ the fu:1is in 
his trust account, he workec:': with Joe anJ 
Shelby ".'aylar to purchase C>.n apartment bui l li cig 
in Utah County for Shelby Taylor. While I kne» 
of this transaction, was not directly involve3 
with it; it was something worked out by John 
Davis, Joe Mascciro, and Shelby Taylor for Snelt,y 
Taylor's benefit. Instead of providing funds 
that were available from his trust account as 
dmrn payment on the property being purchased for 
Mr. Taylor, John Davis persuaded Joe Mascdro to 
personally pay $10,000 down and personally sign u 
promissory note for an additional $10,C<J,, 0:1 th•_· 
purchase price of the apartment building. 
The fact that it was Joseph Mascar:_,, 
respondent Charley Joseph, who paid the $10,000 do' .. rn pciymer.'.: o 
the property purchased by the partnership on behalf of 5,.,,1:, 
Taylor is further supported by the record. ( R. 5. 
Deposition, June 1981, pp. 37-38; Joseph Dq•ositior1, Se2terd,e'. 
1981, pp. 17-18.) 
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B. All Of The $140,000 Received By The Partnership 
1 ml> c z z 1 e=---d-:.. _ _:0'.C;Oe::_O . 
Respondent throughout his brief focuses on the amount 
"f which was paid to the Mascaro-Joseph partnership 
rather than the total amount of $140,000, which was actually 
pa i,J to the partnership. (R. 4, January 18, 1982 hearing, 
p. 19.) Respondent desparately wishes to focus the attention 
of the court on this $100, 000 sum because this sum was egre-
giously embezzled by attorney John S. Davis. Respondent does 
not wish the court to focus on the full $140,000 amount because 
t!ie remaining $38,000 was converted by respondent Charle; 
i to his own use without the knowledge or authorization o! 
11S Joseph Mascaro. (R. 662, 663.) 
On pa}e 4 of respondent's brief, respondent claims: 
The original $100,000.00 cash payment was placed 
attorney Davis into his trust fund. (R. 300, 
450) Of that amount. defendant-respondent, 
directed attorney Davis to give 
$40,000.00 to Taylor, $20,000.00 to plaintiff-
arpellant, '1ascaro, $20,000.IJO to himself 
(Joseph), and to retain the balance in trust in 
the event of potential legal disputes threatened 
by Tanner. 
Througciout this litigation, respondent Joseph '.las 
1cveen several explanations of why he received $38,000 when his 
received which explanations have not been 
_-,,r,s i stent w1 th the facts nor with themselves. The facts, as 
,, 1 isl«' J by the record, are that on June 5, 1979 a check was 
r ,, trom the trust account of John Davis to Charley Joseph. 
checks were drawn at that time for either Mascaro 
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or Taylor. Again, on August 19, 1979, a second check was drawn 
on the trust account of John Davis for $18,000, which was Pui-1 
to Charley Joseph. ( R. 456.) 
In his deposition taken on June 18, 1981, Chcir le 
Joseph could not recall whether he himself had ever received 
any of the original $100, 000 deposited in John Dclvis' s trust 
account. (R. 183-184.) Respondent Joseph did claim that s::irre 
of the funds went to pay expenses and taxes. ( R. 184.) :'he 
fact is, however, that an examination of the checks drawn oc 
the trust account of John Davis show no checks drawn for 
expenses or taxes. 
when 
In the 
confronted 
September 
with the 
1981 deposition of Charle/ 
checks for $18,000 and $20,000, 
respondent recalled receiving said amou:1ts. But in his de,:--
sition, respondent claimed that he was assured "that the 
balanced of the funds was held in trust by Davis and '::e 
distributed to Mascaro and myself upon the resolution of the 
pending transactions." ( R. ln5.) It is clear from th:s 
statement that respondent Joseph knew that the balance of funds 
received by Davis were iri his trust fund and that not:1i!lg had 
been distributed to Mascaro or Taylor. 
Further, in his September 1981 deposition, Charle; 
Joseph had a different story concerning how he received the 
$20,000. At that time he claimed that he was badly in neeJ of 
money and asked attorney Davis for a loan from the proceeJs-
( F. 648.) In his September 1981 deposition, Charley Joseph 
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ma le no mention of his alleged instruction to give Mascaro 
t'il 000 and Taylor $40,000 at the same time he received the 
t:n 000 from Davis's trust account. 
c. The Only Evidentiary Hearing In This Matter 
Resulted In The Denial Of Joseph's Second Motion To Vacate 
Default Judgment. 
It should be noted that the only full evidentiary 
hearing that occurred in this case occurred on January 18, 1982 
before Judge Dean Conder. ( R. 227.) The result of this 
evidentiary hearing was Judge Conder's refusal to set aside the 
Je:ault judgment. ( R. 245.) 
POINT II 
RESPOtlDENT' S BRIEF FAILS TO RESPONDENT TO 
A!'PELLANTS' ARGUMENT THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT CHARLEY JOSEPH'S 
MOTION TO VACA'l'E AND SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMEUT 
BECAUSE THE SAME MOTION BASED ON THE SAME 
ARGUMENTS HAD BEEN DENIED ON T\10 PREVIOUS 
OCCASIONS BY OTHER DISTRICT COURT JUDGES. 
Respondent's brief completely fails to address appel-
lants' argument that pursuant to Utah case law and Section 
78-7-19, Utah Code Ann. (1953) that Judge Dee did not have the 
power to grant respondent's motion to vacate and set aside 
default Judgment because the same motion based on the same 
arguments had been denied on two previous occasions by other 
,11strict court judges. 
The record is clear that respondent brought a motion 
to vacate default judgment before Judge Sawaya on February 6 • 
-5-
1981, which was denied. ( R. 89.) A second motion to vacate 
default judgment was brought before Judge Dean Conder 
January 18, 1982 which was denied. (R. 227, 245.) Ap[•dl 
refers the court to the appellants' brief. pdges 10-16, wl1<>rc,,, 
appellant demonstrates that the motion heard before Judge 
Conder involved the same issues and the same arguments us 
respondent's third motion to set aside default judgment hedrci 
before Judge Dee. 
Appellant should be granted the relief soug:1t for or. 
appeal based upon this uncontested error. 
POINT III 
Rr:SPOtJDENT' S BRIEF FAILS TO ':'O 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE LO'<-IER COURT ERRLC 
IN GRANTING DEFENDANT-RESPONDEN':' CHARLEY JOSF:D!l 'S 
MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE JOSEPC: 
HAD FAILED TO USE DUE DILI'.>ENCE AS REQ 1_'l F'.SD B'' 
UTAH LA\/. 
Respondent in his brief has failed to respond 
appellants' argument that respondent failed to use due dilr-
gence as required by Utah law. ".'he respondent in his brief cir, 
page 6 state: 
Mr. Joseph in fact did believe that attorney 
Davis was defending him and representing his 
interests. Mr. Joseph was a trucker who has 
little education or sophistication in legal 
matters, did not personally know what was neces-
sary to properly defend and represent him, but he 
fully believed that his attorney had done and was 
doing whatever was necessary and most advanta-
geous in protecting his interest. 
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The fact is that Charley Joseph had notice on numerous 
that attorney John Davis was not protecting his 
iterests. (See appellant's brief pp. 16-19.) 
In the evidentiary hearing held on February 18, 1982 
before Judge Dean E. Conder, the Judge focused on the issue of 
respondent Charley Joseph's due diligence. The court stated as 
fullows: 
But if Mr. Joseph kne11 about that in 1979, well 
you've got to show me that in September of 1981, 
when he files a motion to set aside this default 
judgment, that he had good reason not to have 
done it before that time because he didn't know 
about it. He didn't know there was even a 
traris.'l.ction or didn't know for some reason that 
he was being sued. He has been sued by Mr. 
Mascaro and Mr. Taylor and that was served on him 
in 1980. (Transcript of January 18, 1982 hear-
in<J, p. 15.) (3) if Mr. Davis did sor.iething 
that would warrant Mr. Joseph thinking that he 
hai no reason to take action, then Mr. Joseph may 
have a claim for setting aside the default 
I am concerned why Mr. Joseph hasn't taken this 
action prior to this time? (Transcript of 
JanLJary 18, 1982 hearing, p. 17) 
After Judge Conder had clearly indicated to Charley 
Jos9ph C>nd his counsel that they would have to demonstrate to 
the coLJrt some reason why Charley Joseph had not brought his 
m·::iti::in to set aside the default judgment at an earlier date, 
Chcir ley Joseph was allowed to present testimony to the court. 
After the presentation of evidence by Charley Joseph, the Judge 
Jn denying the motion to set aside the default judgment stated: 
And that he (Joseph) knew or should have known 
that Mr. Davis was not doing the job for him that 
he thought he was. 
(Transcript of January 18, 1982 hearing, p. 57.) 
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It is clear from the transcript of the January 18, 
1982 hearing that Judge Conder was concerned with the lack of 
due diligence of Charley Joseph in bringing a motion t0 sc" 
aside the default judgment. The judge, after hear1nJ t_f,, 
evidence, determined that Charley Joseph either knew ur shoujj 
have known that John Davis was not protecting his interests anJ 
yet failed to take any action to replace Mr. Davis or otherwise 
protect his legal position. 
Appellant should be granted the relief soug11t for or, 
appeal based upon this uncontested error. 
POINT IV 
T'lL ISSUE OF WHETHER DA\'IS A 
FRAUD UPON THE COURT TURNS UPOl-l THE ISSUL OF 
DAVIS'S INTEW2 \JHICH IS A FACTUJl.L ISSUE ll'"!I ::H 
'10ULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED IN AU EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING. 
Under Utah law, the question of whether or not a frauc 
has been committed turns upon the intent of the party allegej 
to have committed the fraud. ':'he question of such a par-ty's 
intent is a factual question. Condas v. Adams, 15 Utah 2d 132, 
388 P.2d 803 (1CJ64); Kelly v. Salt Lake Trans;-oorteit1on Co., lOl 
Utah 436, 116 P.2d 383 (1941). 
As noted above, the only evidentiary hearing <lh1ch lus 
ever occurred in this case took place before Judge Dean Conder 
on January 18, 1982, the result of which weis Judge Conder's 
denial of respondent's second motion to vacate default Jude-
ment. For Judge Dee to establish that attorney Davis 
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a fraud upon the court would require that the Judge hold an 
c hearing at which evidence of Davis's fraud could be 
,,, 'ser1ted to the court. Since no such hearing was ever held, 
,1t1•1CJP Dee's set ting aside of the default judgment based upon 
fraud was improper. 
POIIJT V 
THE COMPLAINT GAVE RESPONDENT JOSEPH ADEQUATE 
NOTICE OF THE AMOUNT OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT THAT 
WOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST HIM IN THE EVENT HE FAILED 
TO RESPOND TO THE SUMMONS. 
Respondent in his brief rely heavily upon the case of 
Hurd v. Ford, 78 Utah 49, 276 P.2d 908 (1924), for the proposi-
t1:m that a default judgment admits a plaintiff's right to 
recover something but does not admit the amount that he is 
entitled to recover. Respondent's claim that the juugment 
obtained by appellant was voidable because no evidentiary 
hearing had been conducted to establish the amount of damages. 
It should be noted that Hurd v. Ford was decided by 
this court prior to the adoption of the current Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure which were patterned after the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The purpose of the modern Rules of Civil 
Procedure is to provide "notice pleadings." The issue in 
determining whether the amount of a default is proper under the 
circumstances depends on whether the defendant received appro-
cr1ate notice of the amount being claimed by the plaintiff. 
Cnlumbia Valley Credit Exchange Inc. v. Lampson, 533 P.2d 152 
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(Wa. 1975); Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co. Inc., 165 Cd[, 
Reporter 825, 612 P.2d 915 (Ca. 1980); Purington v. Sound Wes• 
566 P.2d 795 (Mont. 1977). 
It should be further noteu th<.1t in Hur J v. FccrJ 
prayer of the complaint was for the reasonable value of ti"-
services rendered. The cornpl3int of appell3nt in this rrctttcr 
was very specific in praying for a certain arnciunt of money. 
Further, the case of Hurd v. Ford has only been 
court in connection with attorneys' fees and has never bee. 
used to inv3lidate a default judgment as requested by tc.c 
respondent herein. 
I OtJ 
For the set fortl1 
facts provided by respondent in his brief are ir.accurate an_ 
misl9ading. Further, respondent's brief has failed to res;-):,: 
to tvio critical arguments set forth by appellants in then 
brief. namely that Judge Dee overstepped the bounJs of his 
authority when he granted respondent's motion to vacate d 
default judgment which two previous District Court Judges had 
refused to vacate and that Judge Dee erred in granting 
dent's motion to set aside default becduse thE 
respondent had not used due diligence as required by Utah law. 
Since this two points are uncontested in respondent's L•rrel. 
appellants should be granted a reversal of Judge Dee's order 
modifying in part and setting aside in part appellants' def:i,ilt 
judgment. 
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DATED this //.#..._day of November, 1983. 
KESLER & RUST 
By Ci;[ I!) 
Charles w. Hanna 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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